

No. \_\_\_-\_\_\_

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

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R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,  
*Petitioner,*

v.

FRANKLIN D. CAMPBELL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BETTY JEAN CAMPBELL,  
*Respondent.*

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**On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The  
Florida First District Court Of Appeal**

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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Paul D. Clement  
BANCROFT PLLC  
1919 M Street, N.W.  
Suite 470  
Washington, DC 20036

Gregory G. Katsas  
*Counsel of Record*  
JONES DAY  
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001  
(202) 879-3939  
ggkatsas@jonesday.com

DECEMBER 16, 2011

Eric E. Murphy  
JONES DAY  
325 John H. McConnell  
Blvd., Ste. 600  
P.O. Box 165017  
Columbus, OH 43216

*Counsel for Petitioner*

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**QUESTION PRESENTED**

In its traditional formulation, the doctrine of issue preclusion prohibits a party from litigating an issue that was *actually decided* against it in prior litigation. In this case, applying *R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin*, 53 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), the court precluded litigation of issues that the prior jury *may not* have decided.

The question presented is the same one presented in the petition for certiorari in *Martin*: whether this unprecedented expansion of preclusion law violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

**PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING**

The sole plaintiff below was Respondent Franklin D. Campbell, as personal representative of the estate of Betty Jean Campbell.

The original defendants below were Petitioner R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Philip Morris USA, Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Company, Lorillard, Inc., Liggett Group, LLC, and Vector Group Ltd., Inc.

### **CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

Petitioner R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., which in turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of Reynolds American Inc. (“RAI”), a publicly traded corporation.

Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., and Invesco Ltd. hold more than 10% of the stock of RAI. British American Tobacco p.l.c. indirectly holds more than 10% of the stock of RAI through Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc.

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## OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Florida First District Court of Appeal (Pet. App. 1a-2a) is reported at 60 So. 3d 1078. The First District's order denying certification (Pet. App. 10a-11a) is unreported. The Florida Supreme Court's order denying review (Pet. App. 12a-13a) is reported at 67 So. 3d 1050.

## JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The First District entered a final judgment on March 14, 2011. Pet. App. 1a. The court then refused to certify the case to the Florida Supreme Court. Pet. App. 10a. On July 19, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court declined jurisdiction. Pet. App. 12a. On October 7, 2011, Justice Thomas granted an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari until December 16, 2011. This Court has jurisdiction over the First District's judgment. *See, e.g., KPMG LLP v. Cocchi*, No. 10-1521, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2011); *Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown*, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2852-53 (2011); *Clark v. Arizona*, 548 U.S. 735, 746-47 (2006).

## CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Throughout Anglo-American legal history, the doctrine of issue preclusion has been limited to issues “*actually litigated and resolved* in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment.” *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (emphasis added and citation omitted). However, in *R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin*, 53 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), the Florida First District Court of Appeal dramatically departed from that rule. *Martin* held that, in individual cases arising from the class action decertified in *Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.*, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), the defendants would be precluded from litigating issues that the *Engle* jury may *or may not* have resolved against them prior to decertification. In this case, the First District likewise applied *Martin* to preclude Petitioner R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company from litigating issues that the prior jury may not have resolved against it.

In *Martin*, Reynolds today has filed a petition for certiorari presenting the question whether precluding a defendant from litigating issues that the prior jury may not have resolved against it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case presents the same question.

#### A. The *Engle* Class Action

The petition for certiorari in *Martin* fully details the background in *Engle*. Accordingly, we provide only a brief summary here.

*Engle* was a putative class action brought against major cigarette manufacturers, including Reynolds, by allegedly addicted smokers. During Phase I of

*Engle*, the class sought to establish that the defendants had sold defective cigarettes, committed negligence, and fraudulently concealed information about smoking, both individually and through a conspiracy, over a period encompassing more than four decades. The class presented dozens of alternative allegations of defect, negligence, and concealment, many of which applied only to certain cigarette types or time periods. See Pet. for Cert., in *R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin*, No. \_\_\_, at 9-11 (Dec. 16, 2011) (“*Martin* Pet. \_\_\_”). At the end of Phase I, the jury found that each defendant had sold defective cigarettes, been negligent, and concealed information individually and through a conspiracy. But the jury did not specify which of the alternative theories of defect, negligence, and concealment it had adopted, which it had rejected, and which it had simply not addressed. *Id.* at 11-12.

Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court decertified the *Engle* class, but nonetheless “retain[ed] [some of the] Phase I findings,” including the defect, concealment, and conspiracy-to-conceal findings, for use in future litigation. 945 So. 2d. at 1269. The court permitted former class members to file “individual damages actions” within a year, and it decreed that the retained findings “will have res judicata effect” in those actions. *Id.*

In the wake of *Engle*, thousands of these individual “*Engle* progeny” actions, including this case and *Martin*, were filed in state and federal courts throughout Florida. The precise “res judicata effect” of the *Engle* findings—and the due-process limitations on that “res judicata effect”—have been critical issues in all of these cases.

### B. The *Martin* Decision

In *Martin*, the First District addressed the “res judicata effect” that the *Engle* findings should receive in individual progeny cases. In that case, the trial court held that the *Engle* findings establish the tortious-conduct elements of claims for strict liability, negligence, concealment, and conspiracy. The court thus did not require Ms. Martin to prove that the specific cigarettes smoked by her husband were defective, negligently designed or marketed, or the subject of any statements that fraudulently omitted information. As a result, she was permitted to establish liability based only on a showing that her husband had died from an addiction to smoking. *See Martin* Pet. 16.

The First District affirmed. It held that the *Engle* findings “establish the conduct elements of the asserted claims” in all progeny cases, “and individual *Engle* plaintiffs need not prove up those elements or demonstrate the relevance of the findings to their lawsuits.” App. to Pet. for Cert., in *R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin*, No. \_\_\_, at 15a (“*Martin* Pet. App. \_\_a”). Thus, for example, the First District refused to require Ms. Martin to prove that the unfiltered Lucky Strike cigarettes smoked by her husband were defective, much less that any such defect was a proximate cause of his injuries. *Martin* Pet. App. 10a-17a.

The First District rested its decision on a final Omnibus Order entered by the *Engle* trial court, which denied the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. *Martin* Pet. App. 14a-15a. That order did not seek to determine which of the alternative defect, negligence, and concealment allegations the *Engle*

jury had actually accepted. Instead, it concluded only that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the *Engle* findings. *See Martin* Pet. App. 124a. In so doing, it specifically highlighted misconduct theories that applied only to “some”—but not all—brands or types of cigarettes. *Id.*

The First District made no attempt to justify its ruling under normal standards of issue preclusion or due process. Instead, it ignored Reynolds’s arguments on both points, and simply asserted that a contrary ruling “would essentially nullify” *Engle*. *Martin* Pet. App. 11a.

### C. The Proceedings In This Case

Respondent Franklin D. Campbell sued Reynolds and other cigarette manufacturers for the death of his wife from smoking. Various witnesses remembered Ms. Campbell’s smoking history somewhat differently, but it appears that she regularly smoked Viceroy, Winston, and Basic cigarettes. Pet. App. 163a-74a. Mr. Campbell pleaded claims for, among others, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal. Pet. App. 25a-26a.

As in *Martin*, a critical issue in the case was the extent of the “res judicata effect” of the *Engle* findings. And, as in *Martin*, the plaintiff sought to establish liability without proving that the cigarettes smoked by the deceased spouse were defective or fraudulently marketed. Pet. App. 25a-26a.

In a pretrial motion filed in all *Engle* progeny cases pending in Escambia County, including this case and *Martin*, Reynolds moved for a determination that, given the generality of the *Engle* findings and the number of alternative theories litigated in *Engle*, use of those findings to establish elements of a plaintiff’s

individual claims would violate both Florida preclusion law and federal due process. Pet. App. 29a-64a. In an order that applied to all of these cases, the trial court rejected this argument and held that the *Engle* findings conclusively established the tortious-conduct elements for each progeny plaintiff's claims. Pet. App. 3a-6a.

At trial, over Reynolds's continuing objections, Pet. App. 66a, the court instructed the jury that, if Ms. Campbell was an *Engle* class member, the *Engle* findings established essential elements of each of Mr. Campbell's claims. Thus, it told the jury that Reynolds "placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous"; that it "concealed or omitted material information, not otherwise known or available, knowing that material was false or misleading [sic], or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both"; and that it "agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public rely on this information to their detriment." Pet. App. 177a. The court further instructed that those findings were "binding" and could "not be denied or questioned." Pet. App. 178a.

On the strict-liability claim in particular, the court refused to ask the jury whether the cigarettes that Ms. Campbell smoked were defective, or whether any such defect caused her injuries. Pet. App. 179a-80a. Instead, the jury was asked to determine only whether Ms. Campbell was an *Engle* class member—*i.e.*, whether a cigarette addiction caused her death. *Id.* If so, the jury was required to return a plaintiff's ver-

dict, and the only further questions were comparative fault and damages. Pet. App. 180a-83a.

The court gave these instructions even though the *Engle* verdict form does not specify which brands or types of cigarettes the jury had found defective, much less what that defect was. Moreover, the court never disputed Reynolds's argument that the *Engle* findings could have rested on defect theories that would simply not apply to Ms. Campbell.

The jury returned a split verdict. It found that Ms. Campbell was a class member, and that smoking cigarettes manufactured by each of the three defendants was a legal cause of her death. Pet. App. 16a-17a. The jury allocated 39% of the fault to Reynolds, 2% each to Philip Morris USA, Inc., and Liggett Group, LLC, and 57% to Ms. Campbell, and it assessed compensatory damages of \$7.8 million. Pet. App. 18a. The jury found for Defendants on Mr. Campbell's fraudulent-concealment and conspiracy claims. Pet. App. 18a. The trial court later adjusted the damages award in accordance with the comparative-fault finding and entered a judgment of \$3,042,000 against Reynolds, and \$156,000 each against Philip Morris USA and Liggett Group. Pet. App. 14a.

In a post-trial motion, Reynolds renewed its argument that the trial court's use of the *Engle* findings violated due process. Pet. App. 111a-13a. The trial court denied the motion. Pet. App. 7a-9a.

On appeal, Reynolds again argued that the trial court violated due process in precluding litigation over whether the cigarettes smoked by Ms. Campbell were defective. Pet. App. 151a-55a. The First District affirmed the judgment of the trial court, in a per

curiam order that cited *Martin* but contained no additional reasoning. Pet. App. 2a.

Reynolds asked the Florida Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of the case while considering the state-law and federal due-process questions posed in *Martin*, and, ultimately, to reverse on the same basis that it should reverse in *Martin*. See Pet. App. 157a-60a. The Florida Supreme Court held the case pending its disposition of Reynolds's petition for review in *Martin*. After it declined jurisdiction in *Martin*, it likewise declined jurisdiction in this case. Pet. App. 12a.

### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case raises the same question as the petition for certiorari in *Martin*—whether the Due Process Clause prohibits state courts from deviating from the centuries-old, common-law rule limiting issue preclusion to issues *actually decided* in prior litigation. The Court should grant certiorari in this case to resolve that issue. Alternatively, it should hold this petition pending its resolution of the petition for certiorari in *Martin*.

#### I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED WARRANTS REVIEW IN THIS CASE

This case squarely presents the same question as *Martin*. For the reasons explained at length in the petition for certiorari in *Martin*, that question warrants this Court's review. *First*, the preclusion standard applied by the First District here and in *Martin* conflicts with this Court's decision in *Fayerweather v. Ritch*, 195 U.S. 276 (1904), which held, as a matter of due process, that issue preclusion cannot apply where a previous verdict could have rested on grounds different from those sought to be precluded. *Id.* at 299, 307. *Second*, the First District's preclusion

standard dramatically departs from a centuries-old and uniformly followed common-law rule—that issue preclusion does not apply when the verdict from the prior suit could have rested on grounds other than the one for which preclusion is sought. Such a stark abrogation of common-law protections warrants review by this Court and “raises a presumption” of a due-process violation. *Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg*, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). *Third*, the First District’s constitutionally suspect preclusion standard affects thousands of pending *Engle* progeny cases.

This case illustrates the serious constitutional problems with the First District’s preclusion standard. In particular, the *Engle* findings could have rested on many alternative allegations that would have no possible application to Ms. Campbell. For example, the *Engle* defect finding could rest on the theory that “light” cigarettes cause the smoker to smoke more (*see Martin* Pet. 9), but Ms. Campbell did not smoke light cigarettes (Pet. App. 163a-74a). In sum, Reynolds was precluded from litigating critical elements of the claims, not because it was shown that the *Engle* jury *actually decided* the pertinent issues against Reynolds, but only because the *Engle* jury *could have decided* those issues.

The same problem extends to allegations with some possible application to Ms. Campbell. For example, the *Engle* defect finding could rest on allegations that Winston cigarettes were defective only during the time that ammonia was added to them. *See Martin* Pet. App. 124a, 355a-61a. But the jury in this case did not find, and was not asked to find, that *ammoniated* cigarettes were a proximate cause of Ms. Campbell’s death. Pet. App. 16a-19a. And, as ex-

plained above, it is impossible to determine whether the *Engle* jury rested its defect finding on allegations about ammoniated cigarettes in the first place.

This case also confirms the breadth of the First District's preclusion standard. Mr. Martin and Ms. Campbell had significantly different smoking histories: Mr. Martin smoked Lucky Strike cigarettes, (*Martin* Pet. 15-16), whereas Ms. Campbell smoked mainly Viceroy, Winston, and Basic cigarettes (Pet. App. 163a-74a). But despite these different smoking histories, the First District rejected Reynolds's due-process challenge with nothing more than an unreasoned citation to *Martin*. That dismissive disposition leaves no doubt that the Florida courts will now apply the *Engle* findings to each and every brand or type of cigarettes and to each and every allegation of tortious conduct referenced in the year-long *Engle* class trial. Such a sweeping use of issue preclusion—to encompass anything that reasonably could have been decided against the defendants during the year-long Phase I trial in *Engle*—is flatly inconsistent with *Fayerweather*, unprecedented in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and profoundly unfair to the *Engle* defendants.

## II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THIS CASE FOR *MARTIN*

If the Court does not grant review here, it at least should hold this case pending its resolution of *Martin*. To ensure the similar treatment of similar cases, the Court routinely holds petitions that implicate the same issue as other cases pending before the Court, and, once the related case is decided, it resolves the held petitions in a consistent manner. *See, e.g., IMS Health, Inc. v. Schneider*, 131 S. Ct. 3091, 3091

(2011); *Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari*, 131 S. Ct. 1567, 1567 (2011); *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Willes*, 551 U.S. 1111, 1111 (2007); see also *Lawrence v. Chater*, 516 U.S. 163, 166 (1996) (noting that the Court has “GVR’d in light of a wide range of developments, including [its] own decisions”); *id.* at 181 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We regularly hold cases that involve the same issue as a case on which certiorari has been granted and plenary review is being conducted *in order that* (if appropriate) they may be ‘GVR’d’ when the case is decided.”).

Because this case raises the same question presented in *Martin*, the Court should follow that course here. Under its normal scheduling practices, the Court will likely consider this petition and the *Martin* petition at the same conference. If it should grant review in *Martin*, then it should at a minimum hold this case pending resolution of *Martin* on the merits.

#### CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted. Alternatively, the petition should be held pending resolution of *Martin*.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul D. Clement  
BANCROFT PLLC  
1919 M Street, N.W.  
Suite 470  
Washington, DC 20036

Gregory G. Katsas  
*Counsel of Record*  
JONES DAY  
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001  
(202) 879-3939  
ggkatsas@jonesday.com

DECEMBER 16, 2011

Eric E. Murphy  
JONES DAY  
325 John H. McConnell  
Blvd., Ste. 600  
P.O. Box 165017  
Columbus, OH 43216

*Counsel for Petitioner*